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Personalist and Pragmatist Persons

I. How to write journal articles on personalism and pragmatism

It is surprising that at present there is no careful, thorough, full-length comparative analysis of personalism and pragmatism.[1] It is surprising in part simply because academics desperate to publish before they perish have produced comparisons of almost all permutations of philosophies: Marxism and deconstruction, Platonism and postmodernism, process thought and Buddhism, feminism and phenomenology, and act-utilitarianism and existentialism. Many of these studies embody a formula embraced warmly by most journals and tenure review committees: They assert that two philosophies usually thought to be similar really are different in significant ways, or else claim that two philosophies usually thought to be importantly different really have much in common.

This formula certainly could be applied to personalism and pragmatism. On the surface, at least, these two philosophies seem intellectually and culturally close in many important ways and, at the same time, significantly different in other respects. This makes possible (and perhaps desirable) an immense (and perhaps not wholly artificial) scholarly research program for the near future. The following questions, for instance, invite extended examination: To what extent are there parallels between personalist and pragmatist efforts to make compatible science and religion? Is the naturalist strain in pragmatism at odds in the end with a supernaturalist strain

in personalism? Is personalism more "tender minded" than pragmatism? Just how similar are the personalist social gospel and the pragmatist focus on community and social action? In what ways do both personalism and pragmatism utilize shared methods and conceptions of truth, inquiry, and communication? To what extent do personalism and pragmatism incorporate, exemplify, or overcome idealism? In what ways does personalism share pragmatism's rejection of modern philosophy's central dualisms of mind and body, individual and society, subject and object, and fact and value? To what degree is personalism, like pragmatism, committed to radical empiricism, meliorism, and pluralism? How similar is the account of mind, body, and nature in personalism and pragmatism? Do personalists accept the pragmatic characterization of philosophy as criticism of criticism? Is the personalist position philosophically close to pragmatism on issues in, for instance, aesthetics, logic, philosophy of science, ecology, or education? To what extent and in what ways are both personalism and pragmatism the products of a distinctively American situation? How similar are personalist and pragmatist historical relations to writers as diverse as Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and Walt Whitman? To what extent might personalism and pragmatism provide similar rich resources or redirection either to analytic philosophy or its postmodern critics?

These and other issues may be pursued profitably by experts of both pragmatism and personalism. While the number of such scholars may be very small, the value of these undertakings in fact may be very large at present. The time may be especially ripe for personalists and pragmatists to discover and learn from each other. Certainly the recent fragmentation and ongoing expansion of once dominant strains and constraints in professional philosophy in America both contribute to and draw on the present resurgence of interest in pragmatism and the persistence of attention to personalism.

II. A basic orientation shared

Despite their promise, I will not explore the above issues in this essay. I do this in part out of necessity. I write as a pragmatist—with the acknowledged selective emphases of a pragmatist—but not as a scholarly expert on personalism. Moreover, I forego the above agenda in part for another reason—it is not necessary. Here I rely on readers of the *Personalist Forum*—readers who no doubt possess considerable familiarity with the main historical and philosophical features of both personalism and pragmatism.

There is, however, another more important and philosophically relevant reason to forego consideration of what, if anything, personalism and pragmatism have to offer one another. Stated simply, this sort of academic issue itself is not central to either personalists or pragmatists—and it should not be (but too often is) central to professional professors who are personalists or pragmatists. For both personalism and pragmatism, the subject matter, the method, and the value of a philosophy must be found in the actual lives and social arrangements of individuals. Accordingly, the fundamental issue is not whether personalism and pragmatism can do something valuable for one another in theory. Instead, the issue ultimately is whether personalism and pragmatism, alone or jointly, now can do something valuable for persons in practice.

This stance is deeply ingrained in both personalist and pragmatist temperaments (and, perhaps, in American thought far earlier and more broadly). It runs throughout the development of pragmatism, including: Charles Peirce's rejection of the incapacities of Cartesianism and his classification of logic as a normative science; William James's psychology, theory of truth and meliorism; John Dewey's theory of inquiry, his demand for a recovery of philosophy, and his distinction between the "problems of philosophers" and the "problems of men"; and, George Herbert Mead's social behaviorism and philosophy of the act. This same orientation also is evident through-

out personalism, as evidenced by: Howison's "eternal republic"; Bowne's rejection of abstract ethics and his meliorism; Brightman's theory of coherence and his account of individuals as centers of value; and, Martin Luther King's use of this philosophy in the service of non-violent resistance to the oppression of persons.

In fact, this philosophic orientation to the practice of persons, basic to and shared by pragmatism and personalism, is reflected succinctly by the credo or mission statement of the *Personalist Forum,* a journal "devoted to publishing scholarly work that addresses issues of being persons in the world," with "a common conviction that philosophy must take personal categories seriously; speak to issues that confront persons and do so in a language that strives for maximal comprehensibility." Powerful institutional structures and dominant professional practices within philosophy, higher education, and society more generally make this a difficult goal for any scholarly journal today.[2] Still, as poet Robert Browning noted, one's reach should exceed one's grasp, and this surely is a reach or commitment that both personalism and pragmatism make deeply and pervasively.

III. A central issue disputed

In this light, personalists' and pragmatists' extensive mutual disinterest is perhaps even more surprising than the absence of comparisons of the two philosophies by scholars. What has separated these two philosophies that share a general practical, personal stance—as well as, to a large extent, a common time, place, and language? This is a complex issue, at once historical and philosophical. Is the mutual disinterest between personalists and pragmatists rooted in conflicting supernaturalist and naturalist religious views and accounts of God? Is it the result of competing subjective and holistic perspectives on the nature of nature? Is it a function of incompatible theories of final and instrumental values and ends? Is

it, no more and no less, largely a matter of individual temperament and personality? (Perhaps this last suggestion is appropriately personalistic.)

These questions all suggest factors important in the mutual inattention and disregard of personalists and pragmatists. However, another factor appears more central. I want so suggest that, at least from the perspective of many pragmatists, a major source of disinterest and gap between personalists and pragmatists is the very core of personalism itself.

What is this core of personalism? Surely it is the personalist account of the nature of persons. What is this account? Admittedly, there is no single, self-same personalist account of the nature of persons. Different personalists have defined personality as, for example: an individual rational substance; a supernatural, spiritual being; a self-active unity of consciousness operating with memory, freedom, purpose, and reason; a self-directing, uncreated intelligent creator; and, a self-identifying complex unity of activity-potentials. However, throughout these different accounts of the nature of persons (differences that I do not wish to minimize although I skim over them here), personalists do seem to agree on the metaphysical and ethical status of persons. Most broadly and generally, personalists assert that persons are ontologically and/or morally ultimate. Personalists typically thus hold that the notion of personality and the category of persons provide philosophy with its basic principle of explanation. This commitment, it seems, is a minimal, necessary condition that any philosophy must meet if it is to be classified meaningfully as a form or type of personalism.

Pragmatism does not meet this minimum condition. For better or worse (though clearly I think for better) it does not fulfill this requirement. How so? Pragmatism fails to cross the threshold into personalism in an interesting way. It does not reject as philosophically false personalism's central commitments and position so much as it rejects as culturally outmoded and artificial many of the very questions and issues that personalism seeks to address and resolve.

Put simply, personalism and pragmatism largely have failed to engage one another not because they end in different answers but because they begin with different problems. John Dewey made this clear when he argued that pragmatism does not seek principally to criticize the positions of other philosophers, but rather seeks to recover philosophy from traditional philosophical problems and attachments that changing cultural conditions now have rendered obsolete and no longer genuine.

As a result, pragmatists tend not to enter into discussion or argument with personalists on issues central to personalists' views of persons. For instance, pragmatists do not counter personalists' idealism with some form of materialism or realism. Instead, pragmatists reject both idealism and materialism, and the assumptions that give rise to the particular problems to which these positions are responses. Similarly, pragmatists do not counter personalists' commitment to the primacy of persons with an opposing commitment to the primacy of non-persons in some form. Instead, pragmatists reject the primacy of persons and the primacy of non-persons, as well as the metaphysical and moral presuppositions that underlie and call forth these views.

Pragmatism, then, executes an extended end-rum on personalism—and many other philosophies as well. But philosophy is a contact sport, and, as suggested above, there are points of contact in pragmatism's effort to turn the corner on personalism. In some sense, pragmatists might be able to accept the personalist insistence on the moral primacy or ultimacy of persons. For pragmatists, however, this primacy does not denote a metaphysical fact or a moral reality secure and fixed antecedent to human action. Instead, it signifies a moral ideal, and thus leads straight to a practical agenda for social action and societal reconstruction. Similarly, in some sense, pragmatists might be able to accept the personalist insistence on the ontological primacy of personal life or experience. For pragmatists, though, this primacy is intelligible only in light of radical empiricist accounts of experience as transactional and selves

as intrinsically social—accounts in which both experiencing social subject and experienced natural object are reciprocal aspects of an irreducible primary unity.

Viewed from this perspective, pragmatism may provide an expansion of personalism—rather than its critical rejection or indifferent dismissal. That is, pragmatism may make possible an expanded understanding of the metaphysical nature, social development, and moral value of persons. The success of such a pragmatist expansion of a philosophy of persons depends upon an articulation of persons as: 1) natural organisms; 2) social selves; and 3) communal individuals. I will develop briefly each of these three pragmatist notions.

IV. Persons as natural organisms with meanings

For pragmatists, there is a basic continuity between persons and monkeys, kangaroos lizards, frogs, spiders, trout, maples, mushrooms, plankton, and viruses: All are living organisms that strive and suffer, satisfy and need, grow and decay, and act and are acted upon in a particular environment. Dewey emphasizes this point by asserting that organisms do not live *in* their environment but *through* and *by* their environment. Activity is as much the act of an environment as it is the act of an organism. The relation of an organism to its environment is not a simple *interaction*—a mixing of two entities that otherwise exist independently from one another. It is a *transaction*—a primary, unified whole in which parts or aspects distinguished by reflection exist only in mutual relation to one another.

For pragmatists, there also is a basic difference (though not a discontinuity) between persons and other forms of life: The lives of persons are marked by the development and activity of mind—that is, by the presence of meaning or significance. This is a key point and it easily is misunderstood: For pragmatists, mind is not something that a person has—somewhere, such as the pineal gland, heart, or

brain; mind is not something separate from, alien to, or independent of body or nature; and, mind is not innate, eternal, mystic, or in principle private.

What, then, is mind? Though it may seem otherwise at first, to ask this question, with the pragmatists, is not to raise the traditional mind/body problem. Instead, it is to reject this problem in its entirety: There simply is no general philosophical mind/body problem. For pragmatists, mind and body are not separate original sorts of being. Accordingly, there is no special philosophical task of putting them together again, and there also is no special philosophical problem about how supposedly separate kinds of things interact or how interacting kinds of things remain supposedly separate.

Instead, there is a need for factual inquiry into the development, function, consequences, and conditions of the organization of various modes of life. This inquiry may identify the emergence and presence of mind or personality at a particular point in the development of these kinds of organization. Because this point is basic to the pragmatist view of persons, I quote at length Dewey's summary of the development of mind in "Nature, Life and Body-Mind," the seventh chapter of *Experience and Nature*.

> If we identify, as common speech does, the physical as such with the inanimate we need another word to denote the activity of organisms as such. Psycho-physical is an appropriate term. Thus employed, "psycho-physical" denotes the conjunctive presence in activity of need-demand-satisfaction...Psycho-physical does not denote an abrogation of the physico-chemical; nor a peculiar mixture of something physical and something psychical (as a centaur is half man and half horse); it denotes the possession of certain qualities and efficacies not displayed by the inanimate....
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> With the multiplication of sensitive discriminatory reactions to different energies of the environment...and with the increase in scope and delicacy of movements..., feelings vary more and more in quality and intensity.
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> Complex and active animals *have* , therefore feelings which vary abundantly...They *have* them, but they do not know they have them. Activity is psycho-physical, but not "mental," that is not aware of

> meanings...."mind" is an added property assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication. Then the qualities of feeling become significant of objective differences in external things and of episodes past and to come. This state of things in which qualitatively different feelings are not just had but are significant of objective differences, is mind. Feelings are not longer just felt. They have and they make *sense;* record and prophesy. (195-196, 198)

This view of the emergence and nature of mind has both presuppositions and implications. As a theory of the links intrinsic to body and mind, it presupposes, and is part of, a larger pragmatic theory that joins nature and experience. This theory is set forth most fully by James in *Principles of Psychology* and *Essays in Radical Empiricism,* and by Dewey in *Experience and Nature.* I do not want here to explicate at length this theory, but I do want to call attention to one of its revolutionary implications. Because pragmatists insist that experience is an irreducible unified exchange or transaction between organism and environment, the categories of traditional metaphysics become simply the more or less useful products of reflection. That is, categories such as subject and object, mind and body, thoughts and things, experience and nature, self and others, and fact and value are reflective distinctions rather than existential dichotomies. These categories have functional status in thought; they do not have metaphysical status in reality. In reality, an experiencing subject and an experienced object are unified in an as-yet-unanalyzed totality.

It is in this sense that James and Dewey term experience (or "culture") "double-barrelled"--it includes both subject and object as features of an irreducible whole. By contrast, to the extent that personalism asserts the metaphysical primacy of persons, subjects, experiences, or thoughts over non-persons, objects, nature, or things, it is "single-barrelled" and stands in opposition to pragmatism. Just as pragmatists have argued on this issue that honest empiricists must become *radical* empiricists, so too at this point I think experience compels honest personalists to become *radical* personalists, "double-barrelled" personalists, pragmatists.

The major immediate implication of this view is straightforward. Because the development of mind requires language and communication, the development of communication and the production of meanings are one with the development of mind. Any adequate philosophy of persons must capture this transformation effected by and through communication. It also must recognize that the pragmatic account of persons as natural organisms with minds points to the irreducibly and centrally social character of persons. In pragmatist terms, the self is fundamentally and thoroughly a social self. As such, it is a precarious product of social arrangements rather than a secure, given fact about individual nature or reality at large.

V. Persons as Social Selves

For pragmatists, the emergence of mind marks the transformation or reorganization of an organism into a self. This transformation is a social process and the resulting self is an intrinsically social being.

This point is more startling and far-reaching than at first it may seem. Pragmatists agree, of course, with Aristotle's observation that human beings are social creatures. We are born, grow up, live, and die in the presence of others. But pragmatists also assert something different and deeper. The point here is not simply that persons live in society (any more than organisms live in their environment). Instead, it is that persons live through and by social relations and arrangements that thus enter into and are inseparable from their very being. The relation of person to society is not one of detachable part to composite whole. A person is not like a separable marble incidentally surrounded by other marbles in a child's bucket. A person is not even like a spark plug in an automobile engine, able to function only in connection with many other parts. Rather, a person's relation to society is organic, historical, and mutually constitutive and transformative.

There simply is no self stripped of complex social relations. George Herbert Mead makes this point effectively by sharply distinguishing a person as a self from a person as a body, and by contrasting the social with the physiological. In a well-known passage in *Mind, Self, and Society*, he writes:

> The body can be there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without there being a self involved in the experience. The self has the characteristic that it is an object to itself. The individual experiences himself as such not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, only in so far as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or his experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself....Such a self is not...primarily a physiological organism....The self, as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure, and it arises in social experiences.... (139-140)

The formation of selves, then, depends upon organized social practices, effective institutions, and shared meanings—what Mead terms the "Generalized Other." There is nothing automatic about this; there is no guarantee that societies always, everywhere, and fully will manifest these prerequisite conditions of self development. When these conditions in fact are not satisfied, their satisfaction constitutes a pressing educational and political agenda for pragmatists.

From the standpoint of education, this agenda reaches far beyond the schools. Social institutions such as the government, the economy, the legal system, religious traditions, the family, the hospital, the prison, sports, the military, and the workplace all have educational consequences. Frequently these results are much broader and longer lasting than those of schools, even though it is only in the schools that particular educational results are the most immediate and directly intended institutional goals. These institutions have far-reaching educational consequences in that they transmit a

culture's concerns, knowledge, skills, and way of life to its immature members.

Without this educative transmission and communication, social life could not continue. It is in this context that Dewey virtually identifies the development of selves with communication and education. In *Democracy and Education*, he writes:

> Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. (7-8)

These institutions, accordingly, can be evaluated in terms of the meanings, habits, and character that they produce and transmit. In this light, pragmatists measure the worth of any social institution by its effects—by its role in developing or stunting selves, enlarging or narrowing experience, and deepening or impoverishing meaning. Dewey employs precisely this strategy throughout his later work: from his efforts in *Liberalism and Social Action* to reconstruct traditional liberalism to his criticism in *Freedom and Culture* of markets that serve private interests under the guise of freedom; from his analysis in *Individualism: Old and New* of the "lost" individual and his sketch of a new individualism to his efforts in *A Common Faith* to expand religious experience and detach it from supernaturalist doctrines; from his attempts in *Art as Experience* to free aesthetic experience from the confines of museums to his focus in *The Public and Its Problems* on democracy as a way of life rather than merely a way of government. For pragmatists, then, growth is not simply the aim of education. It also is the moral basis for cultural criticism and cultural reconstruction.

In this way, attention to the social production and growth of persons as genuine selves underlies the pragmatist fusing of education and democracy.[3] Education as the development of genuine selves is possible only in a thoroughly democratic society, what Dewey calls a "great community" in contrast to a "great society."

Democracy in turn can flourish only if its members are educated, grow, and become selves. Only education, understood as the ongoing growth of persons as selves, continually creates free activities and shared meanings; such shared activities and meanings are the very core of a democratic way of life.

Thus, for pragmatists, the growth of persons as selves is the basic *method* of social progress, as well as both the goal of education and the moral basis of social action. In the absence of an understanding of persons as social selves, this method cannot be adopted and utilized. Many philosophers have failed to recognize this, and as a result they mistakenly have regarded an ideal for action as a fact for belief. Here it makes no pragmatic difference whether this supposed fact is metaphysically "grounded"—as it appears, I think, for many idealists and personalists—or "ungrounded"—as it is for neo-pragmatists who hold to a sharp public/private dualism and like to pretend that the development of a person as a self is a matter of one's own private invention. When this happens, concern for persons in theory ironically hinders the social development of persons in practice. In such a situation, it is crucial that personalists, like pragmatists, preach practice.

VI. Persons as Communal Individuals

For pragmatists, it is a fact that the development of persons as selves is a social process. Now, the existence of this process is distinct from the value of its products. There is a gap, that is, between the social formation of a self—the self's mere social existence—and the social fulfillment of that self—its social self-realization.

This notion of an actualized self is, for pragmatists, the notion of a person as a genuine individual. Recognizing that individuality is a social product, two central questions arise: What is it—just what product of social forces is it? And, how is it produced—what social arrangements facilitate or impede its development?

Pragmatists often begin to address these issues by disputing popular misconceptions and arguing about what individuality is not. So, in the first place, for example, individuality is not an innate characteristic or possession. For pragmatists, individuals are made (if and when they exist), not born. This may provide hope, but it offers no assurance. In the second place, individuality is not a matter of personal self-sufficiency. It is not something learned at survivalist camps, taught in New Age self-help books, or observed in old movies of the American West and new television commercials for cigarettes and Japanese automobiles. These images aside, everyone is involved in innumerable primary social interdependencies, as crop failures, distant wars, global pollution, sick relatives, power outages, teachers' strikes, and international markets, for instance, make painfully clear. This may be a depressing message to the rich, the smart, and the hard working. It means that no one person—no matter now wealthy, intelligent, or persistent—can become fully an individual on his or her own in the absence of appropriate, sustaining social conditions. A Walkman, home security system, and more hours in the library, office, or gym aren't enough. In the third place, genuine individuality is not a matter of simply acting, looking, or being different from everyone else. Attempting to be unlike others for its own sake is no less mindless conformity than attempting to be like others for its own sake. In each case, whether doing or avoiding something, a person's actions are uncritical, unstable, and directed by others. This, of course, runs against the grain of carefully marketed messages of both our culture and counter-cultures. Finally, uniqueness, no more than mere difference from others, is no guarantee of individuality. This is not to deny that each of us is unique in various ways. However, the mere uniqueness of a person is quite distinct from that person's ongoing self-realization. So, it simply is to deny that uniqueness of any sort and by itself is a sufficient condition of individuality.

Instead, individuality is a matter of associated activities, harmonious values, shared meanings, and developed character. It is the

social realization of the social self. This social realization is possible only to the extent that a society has become a community. That is, the self is social, and when the self's society is a genuine community then the self is fully an individual. Put in the language of an SAT analogy exam: society:community; self:individual.

To grasp this point, it is essential to understand the very special, technical, different meanings that pragmatists give to the very ordinary terms "society" and "community." For Dewey (much like Royce), a community is a special kind of society. It is a society that embodies a democratic way of life (and not simply a democratic form of government). This means that it is a society in which all persons affected by institutions and practices participate in their direction. This is the democratic idea in its generic sense, for Dewey. In *The Public and Its Problems*, he briefly spells out this idea in summary form:

> From the standpoint of the individual, it [the idea of democracy] consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with interests and goods which are common. Since every individual is a member of many groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in connection with other groups. (327-328)

To the degree, then, that individuals do not participate consistently and thoroughly in this social formation of decisions and values, democracy as an individual's self-determining way of life simply does not exist. Similarly, to the degree that social groups do not nourish both compatible interests and differing personal potentials—a sort of harmonic divergence—democracy as a free society's way of life does not exist. In these conditions, society fails to be a community, and persons fail to be individuals. For Dewey, these conditions are the real situation in which we live. Changing this unsatisfactory situation will require new inquiry, communication,

and a radical reconstruction of almost all our institutions and practices: "The highest and most difficult kind of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive art of communication must take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathe life into it" (*The Public* 350).

Rather than explore pragmatist strategies for such changes, I want to return to the meaning of this situation for a pragmatic account of persons as communal individuals. For pragmatists, the actual lives of person today fail to exhibit the loyalties, hopes, and meanings characteristic of fully communal individuals. Accordingly, at worst this category of persons as individuals is a mere fiction, an unreality. At best, it is an ideal. It is an ideal, however, only to the extent that it involves a deep imaginative commitment, in action as well as belief, that unifies our lives and directs our efforts.

Dewey terms this commitment "faith." It is not faith in God or Being or Spirit or nature or history. Instead, it is a human faith, a democratic faith, a faith in the possibilities of collective human imagination, intelligence, and will. This faith, Dewey claims, has emerged only recently and incompletely in human history. Even in democratic governments today, beliefs and values include strong preferences developed much earlier for authority instead of participation, inquiry, and communication. These preferences for authority—anything but rare in traditional philosophy—today powerfully stall and threaten the development of persons and community. More immediately, they even greatly undermine action on behalf of faith in these ideals.

In this context, the relation of personalism to pragmatism is both uncertain and malleable. Pragmatists may worry that personalists effectively and principally are committed only to an *idealism of persons*. At the same time, pragmatists may hope that personalists, with pragmatists, instead centrally are committed in theory and practice to an *ideal of persons*. From a pragmatic standpoint, this is a difference that makes a difference—both to philosophers and to the persons about whom they philosophize.

Notes

[1]Let me indicate at the outset how I use these terms here. First, I take pragmatism to be the philosophy set forth by Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, C.I. Lewis, and others, and developed more recently in the work of writers such as John J. McDermott, John E. Smith, John Lachs, Sandra Rosenthal, and many others (most of whom are associated with the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy). The resurgence of interest in pragmatism thus understood is summarized neatly by McDermott in "The Renascence of Classical American Philosophy" in his *Streams of Experience*. This broad body of work, in my view, does not include the anti-theory views often termed "pragmatism" by some contemporary literary theorists. Nor does it include the so-called "neo-pragmatism" of philosophers such as Richard Rorty. I have contrasted pragmatism and Rorty's views in my review of his most recent book, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, in this journal, V 6.1 (1990). Second, I take personalism to be the philosophy set forth by George Holmes Howison, Borden Parker Bowne, Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Albert C. Knudson, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and others, and developed more recently by Walter G. Muelder, Warren Steinkraus, John Lavely, Peter A. Bertocci, and many others (most of whom are associated with the Personalist Discussion Group). This is, I think, the philosophy that John Lavely has termed "personal idealism" in his *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on "Personalism." To a large extent it also is the tradition chronicled by Deats and Robb in their collection, *The Boston Personalist Tradition*. This collection is reviewed by Robert Neville in this journal, V 5.1 (1989).

[2]I discuss some of these practical issues in: "On Re-Visioning Philosophy," and, "Do American Philosophers Exist?" Bruce Wilshire discusses in depth these issues in the context of professionalism in the university in his *The Moral Collapse of the University*. David Applebaum reviewed this book in this journal, V 6.1 (1990). A.J. Mandt provides a parallel analysis in the context of the pluralist movement within philosophy in his "The Inevitability of Pluralism."

[3]I discuss in greater detail this issue in the context of Dewey's philosophy in *John Dewey*. This, in turn, is reviewed by Michael Sullivan in this issue of this journal.

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